PP v. KOW SWEE CHYE &ORS [2026] MLRHU 678

[2026] MLRHU 678

PP
v.
Kow Swee Chye & Ors

High Court Malaya, Shah Alam
Aslam Zainuddin J
[Case No: BA-45-29-06/2025, BA-45-30-06/2025 & BA-45A-91-06/2022]
26 March 2026

Case(s) referred to:
Abdullah Atan v. PP & Other Appeals [2020] 6 MLRA 28; [2020] 6 MLJ 727; [2020] 9 CLJ 151 (refd)
Ariff Arhannan Che Udin v. PP & Another Appeal [2022] 4 MLRA 172; [2022] 3 MLJ 157; [2022] 4 CLJ 1; [2022] 3 AMR 705 (refd)
Mat v. PP [1963] 1 MLRH 400; [1963] 1 MLJ 263 (refd)
Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 MLRA 158; [1991] 3 MLJ 169; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 311 (refd)
PP v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 2 MLRH 345; [1998] 6 MLJ 678; [1998] 4 CLJ 209 (refd)
PP v. Saimin & ORS [1971] 1 MLRH 91; [1971] 2 MLJ 16 (refd)

Legislation referred to:
Criminal Procedure Code, s 180(1), (4)
Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss 37(d), 39B, First Schedule
Penal Code, s 34

Counsel:
For the prosecution: Shahrul Ekhsan Hasim; TPR
For the accused: Alfred Egin; M/s Alfred Egin & Co
For the accused: Alan Kang Wei Luen; M/s Alan Kang & Co

[Acquitting and discharging the accused persons.]

JUDGMENT
Aslam Zainuddin J:

[1] The following charge (P2) was preferred against the accused persons:

PERTUDUHAN

"Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 15 September 2021 jam lebih kurang 12.30 tengah hari, di Restoran Hailam Kopitiam, The Mines 2, E18 Mines Wellness City, 43300, Seri Kembangan, dalam daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Methamphetamine seberat 761.0 gram, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah s 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 39B(2) Akta yang sama dan dibaca bersama s 34 Kanun Keseksaan."

[2] The second accused Kho Kok Teck had passed away on 19 August 2025 before the trial concluded. Therefore the case proceeded against the first and third accused only.

[3] At the end of the prosecution case, I found that the prosecution had failed to make out a prima facie case against the accused persons. Ergo I acquitted and discharged them. The prosecution being dissatisfied have now appealed to the Court of Appeal. My reasons now follow.

[4] The facts of the prosecution case:

4.1 Pada 15 September 2021 jam lebih kurang 12.30 tengah hari, bertindak atas maklumat, Pengadu dalam kes ini iaitu Inspektor Mohd Amel Husny bin Mohd Supian, telah mengetuai pasukan Narkotik IPD Serdang telah membuat pemerhatian di kawasan bangunan The Mines 2, E18, Mines Wellness City, Seri Kembangan Selangor ("tempat kejadian").

4.2 Pada jam lebih kurang 12.45pm, Pengadu telah lihat sebuah kereta jenis Honda City berwarna hitam nombor pendaftaran VDR 9273 dinaiki 3 lelaki Cina telah hadir dan parking di kawasan parking berbayar di premis tempat kejadian tersebut. Kemudian pengadu lihat pemandu (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OKT1), penumpang hadapan (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OKT2) dan penumpang belakang (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai OKT3) telah keluar dari kereta dan berjalan masuk ke dalam premis tempat kejadian tersebut. OKT2 dilihat memegang (1) beg warna merah di tangan kiri beliau sambil berjalan.

4.3 Ketiga-tiga OKT kemudian dilihat duduk di satu meja bulat di luar premis Restoran Hailam Kopitiam di dalam bangunan tempat kejadian tersebut (aras bawah). Pengadu kemudian melihat OKT2 meletakkan beg warna merah yang dipegang di atas meja bulat tersebut. Kemudian OKU dan OKT3 beredar keluar dari premis Restoran Hailam Kopitiam manakala OKT2 masih duduk di meja bulat. Pada masa yang sama pengadu dan pasukan serbuan bertindak menahan semua OKT. Pengadu telah perkenalkan diri dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa Polis. Seterusnya pengadu membuat pemeriksaan di hadapan semua OKT dapati (1) beg warna merah bertulis fipper Feel The Rubber! di atas meja bulat tersebut. Pemeriksaan lanjut dapati di dalam beg ini terdapat:

a) (1) peket plastik warna kuning bertulis Choicest Tea of Anxi Natural di dalamnya terdapat (1) peket plastik berisi bahan disyaki dadah syabu (anggaran berat: 520.95 gram).
b) (1) peket plastik warna hijau bertulis HIGH QUALITY NATURAL TEA di dalamnya terdapat (1) peket plastik berisi bahan disyaki dadah syabu (anggaran berat: 517.70 gram)
(Jumlah berat keseluruhan barang kes adalah 1038.65 gram)

4.4 Kemudian, pengadu telah membuat pemeriksaan fizikal terhadap OKT 1 telah menjumpai (1) keratan straw di dalamnya mengandungi serbuk berwarna putih disyaki dadah Ketamine (anggaran berat: 0.29 gram) di dalam poket hadapan kiri seluar jeans warna biru yang dipakai olehnya dan turut dijumpai (1) kunci penggera warna hitam bertulis H dan (1) rangkai anak kunci yang terdapat kunci dan (1) kad akses warna hitam bertulis UNIV 360.

4.5 Pemeriksaan fizikal terhadap OKT2 pula telah menjumpai (1) peket plastik lutsinar berisi bahan disyaki dadah Ketamine (anggaran berat: 1.58 gram) di dalam poket belakang kanan seluar jeans warna hitam jenama DP Denim. Pemeriksaan ke atas OKT3 tidak menjumpai apa-apa barang salah. Pemeriksaan lanjut terhadap kereta Honda City warna hitam No Pendaftaran VDR 9273 yang dinaiki ketiga-tiga OKT juga tidak menjumpai barang salah. Pengadu seterusnya telah merampas barang kes dan tangkap ketiga-tiga OKT dan dibawa balik ke IPD Serdang untuk tindakan lanjut.

4.6 Barang kes telah dihantar ke Jabatan Kimia untuk dianalisa. Hasil analisa mendapati barang kes adalah mengandungi berat bersih: Methamphetamine seberat 761.0 gram, 0.04 gram Ketamine dan 1.23 gram Methamphetamine.

The Court's Duty At The End Of The Prosecution Case

[5] Section 180(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code ("CPC") provides that at the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the court shall consider if the prosecution has established a prima facie case against the accused person. Section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code states:

180. Procedure after conclusion of case for prosecution
(1) When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused.
(2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.
(3) If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence.
(4) For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.

[6] Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary (11th edn) defines a prima facie case as:
"A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the other side."

[7] In PP v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 2 MLRH 345; [1998] 6 MLJ 678; [1998] 4 CLJ 209, the learned Judge Vincent Ng held:
"What then constitutes a 'prima facie case'? 'Prima facie' means on the face of it or at first glance. To me, in the light of Act A979, perhaps the most appropriate definition of a 'prima facie case' could be found in the Oxford Companion of Law (p 987), which has it as:
A case which is sufficient to call for an answer.
While prima facie evidence is evidence which is sufficient to establish a fact in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, but is not conclusive.
It would follow that there should be credible evidence on each and every essential ingredient of the offence. Credible evidence is evidence which has been filtered and which has gone through the process of evaluation. Any evidence which is not safe to be acted upon should be rejected."

[8] In the Federal Court case of Abdullah Atan v. PP & other appeals [2020] 6 MLRA 28; [2020] 6 MLJ 727; [2020] 9 CLJ 151 FC, Tengku Maimun Chief Justice (as she then was) said:
"[42] The purpose of s 180(4) of the CPC was thus not to exclude the use of presumptions, inferences, or anything other than direct evidence, to establish a prima facie case. On the contrary:
(a) the Privy Council in Haw Tua Tau itself expressly envisaged that inferences may be drawn from the primary facts adduced, and the court must presume such inferences to be true at the close of the prosecution's case; and
(b) statutory presumptions have often been invoked by the prosecution in order to establish a prima facie case of drug trafficking in previous cases.
No concern was raised in Parliament as to the use of presumptions when considering amendments to s 180 of the CPC (see: Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 MLRA 158; [1991] 3 MLJ 169; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 311; Tan Boon Kean v. PP [1995] 2 MLRA 28; [1995] 3 MLJ 514; [1995] 4 CLJ 456; [1995] 3 AMR 3007).
[43] Section 180(4) of the CPC must be read in light of its context and legislative purpose. By so doing, the phrase 'credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence' in s 180(4) means that the prosecution may prove each ingredient of the offence either:
(a) by adducing credible direct evidence of that ingredient;
(b) by drawing inferences of fact, ie adducing credible circumstantial evidence, from which the ingredient can be inferred; or
(c) by invoking presumptions of law, ie adducing credible evidence of the relevant basic facts, to invoke a statutory presumption that the ingredient exists.
[58] Section 180(4) of the CPC and s 37(da) of the DDA must be read harmoniously, applying the doctrine of harmonious construction. In a nutshell, the doctrine requires that the legislation be construed in a way which would achieve a harmonious result and that construction should favour coherence in the law (see Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai & Anor v. Muziadi Mukhtar [2019] 6 MLRA 307; [2020] 1 MLJ 141; [2020] 1 CLJ 1 at paras 78-79). A harmonious construction would limit 'credible evidence' to the actual finding of possession, as propounded in Muhammed bin Hassan, and once that is established successfully, it would invoke the presumption of trafficking. Defence will then be called on trafficking where the legal burden would shift to the accused to disprove trafficking."

[9] In the Federal Court case of Ariff Arhannan Che Udin v. PP & Another Appeal [2022] 4 MLRA 172; [2022] 3 MLJ 157; [2022] 4 CLJ 1; [2022] 3 AMR 705 FC, Abdul Rahman Sebli FCJ (as he then was) opined:
"[19] Given the imperatives of ss 37(d) and 37(da) of the DDA, there are effectively two ways in which a prima facie case of trafficking under s 39B(1)(a) of the Act can be established by the prosecution at the close of its case:
(a) by invoking the statutory presumption of trafficking under s 37(da), provided it is proved by actual or affirmative evidence that the accused was in possession of the drug. This is presumed trafficking; or
(b) by invoking the statutory presumption of possession and knowledge of the nature of the drug under s 37(d), provided it is proved that the accused had custody or control of the drug. Read with the definition of trafficking under s 2 and taking into account the amount of the drug, an inference of trafficking can be drawn. This is trafficking by inference: Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor And Another Appeal [1980] 1 MLRA 283; [1981] 1 MLJ 64."

[10] In order for the prosecution to make out a prima facie case for the trafficking charge against the accused persons, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove the following three elements of the offence under s 39B of the Act. There are first, the drugs involved must be a dangerous drug as specified in the First Schedule to the Act. Secondly, the drugs were in the possession of the accused persons and thirdly, the accused persons were trafficking in the said drugs. Lastly all of them had a common intention to do so as stated in s 34 of the Penal Code.

[11] As far as the first element goes, there is no dispute that the drugs in this case was 761.0 grams of methamphetamine.

[12] It is the remaining two elements that have not been proven by the prosecution id est the drugs were in the possession of the accused persons and that they were trafficking the same with common intention.

[13] In this case the prosecution had failed to prove possession of the drugs by the first and third accused. According to the evidence of the raiding officer, the deceased second accused was the one who was seen to be holding on to the red bag containing the drugs at all times. At no time did the first or third accused ever hold the red bag containing the drugs. At the Hailam Kopitiam restaurant, the first and third accused left the second accused seated at the table while both of them walked away. It can be inferred from this that the first and third accused didn't know what was in the red bag carried by the second accused. The element of custody and control of the drugs has not been proven against the first and third accused. Therefore knowledge and possession of the drugs cannot be presumed against them by s 37(d) of the DDA. It follows that common intention under s 34 of the Penal Code is also not proven.

[14] The red bag was never tendered as an exhibit in court. According to the investigating officer the said bag has gone missing and cannot be located.

[15] I am mindful of the oft quoted case of Mat v. PP [1963] 1 MLRH 400; [1963] 1 MLJ 263, that was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 MLRA 158; [1991] 3 MLJ 169; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 311.

[16] Finally it is pertinent to recall what was said by Justice Sharma in PP v. Saimin & ORS [1971] 1 MLRH 91; [1971] 2 MLJ 16, where his lordship said:
"It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the charge against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and the court is not entitled merely for the sake of the joy of asking for an explanation or the gratification of knowing what the accused have got to say about the prosecution evidence to rule that there is a case for the accused to answer. The proof of a case against the accused depends for its support not upon the absence or weakness of the explanation on his part but on the positive affirmative evidence of his guilt given by the prosecution."

[17] Therefore the accused persons were acquitted and discharged for the trafficking charge - P2.